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 Statement by Mr. Sergii SHUTENKO, Director of the Department General of International Security and Military-Technical Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, at the Third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Cluster 1: Nuclear Disarmament

(2 May 2025, New York)

Mr. Chair,

Ukraine aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union, as well as the joint statement delivered by Japan on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education. We would like to make additional remarks in our national capacity.

Ukraine remains fully committed to achieving the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons.

We reaffirm the need for concrete progress towards the pursuit of global nuclear disarmament, especially through the strict, full, and universal implementation of all NPT obligations and commitments from previous Review Conferences, as well as the overall reduction in the global nuclear weapons stockpiles.

The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains one of the top priorities for Ukraine in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

However, Russia's withdrawal of its ratification of the CTBT renders the prospect of its entry into force even more difficult. Ukraine urges all Annex II States to sign and/or ratify the CTBT without preconditions or further delay. We also call for a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions.

Ukraine supports the commencement of negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) without further delay, recognizing that the FMCT would be a logical and practical next step essential to constrain the nuclear arms race and achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament.

We firmly believe that nuclear disarmament verification is indispensable for advancing the goal of nuclear disarmament. Ukraine further supports concrete steps on nuclear risk reduction and measures to enhance transparency and accountability.

Mr. Chair,

In 1994, Ukraine made the historic decision to renounce nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. We placed all our nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards. In return, we received solemn security assurances—chiefly through the Budapest Memorandum. Those assurances have been fundamentally breached. In 2014, a Nuclear-Weapon State violated Ukraine’s sovereignty through the illegal occupation of Crimea.

In 2022, that same State launched a full-scale war of aggression, issuing explicit nuclear threats and turning peaceful nuclear energy facilities into military strongholds. We call upon all States Parties to the NPT to condemn any threats of nuclear weapons use.

This is not merely a regional crisis—it is a direct assault on the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. When a Nuclear-Weapon State acts with impunity, violating its own commitments under the NPT and undermining trust in security assurances, the credibility of Article VI and the broader Treaty framework is gravely undermined.

This reality raises a fundamental question: how can we, in good faith, encourage non-nuclear-weapon States to forgo nuclear weapons when the commitments made to those who disarm are not upheld?

Ukraine firmly believes that without credible guarantees, nations will be unwilling to reduce their arsenals, fearing that disarmament could leave them vulnerable. Trust must be restored through binding commitments that ensure the protection of states. Security assurances are important components of binding and agreed security arrangements, strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, contributing to confidence-building and nuclear disarmament, and enhancing regional and global security.

Mr. Chair,

Regrettably, meaningful progress in nuclear disarmament remains unattainable as long as the Russian Federation continues its war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia gravely undermines the international security environment and the very foundations of the disarmament architecture.

The deployment of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus undermines long-standing arms control principles and escalates regional tensions.

The Russian Federation’s decision to suspend its participation in the New START Treaty poses a major threat to global disarmament efforts. The reduction of deployed strategic nuclear weapons under the New START Treaty, notably enhanced by its robust verification mechanism, contributes to the implementation of Article VI of the NPT. Russia must immediately return to compliance with the New START Treaty and fulfil all its obligations, including by facilitating New START inspections on Russian territory.

Ukraine firmly believes that only through effective collective measures can the international community avert a nuclear disaster. Complete and irreversible nuclear disarmament remains the only guarantee against the catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

Thank you.