Statement by the delegation of Ukraine at the informal meeting of the General Assembly plenary on the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
(8 March 2024)
The delegation of Ukraine would like to flag its position on the issue of veto.
We consider it absolutely inappropriate that a country in the permanent seat has a privilege to exercise the right of veto when considering situations in which that country is directly involved as a party to the conflict and moreover, the instigator of the conflict. The delegation of Ukraine therefore strongly supports all initiatives aimed at restricting the use of veto.
The legitimate reasons for restricting the use of veto by a permanent member of the Security Council should include cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, as well as conflicts and situations in which a permanent member is involved and cannot vote impartially due to the conflict of interests.
Veto initiative has strengthened the role of the General Assembly in the relationship between the UN's two principal organs. Now it is also important to open avenues for discussing other ideas of how to further improve the Assembly’s toolbox and ability to help the Council in case the latter is immobilized. That includes the idea of providing the UN General Assembly with a real power to overcome the veto by two-thirds of the votes reflecting the will of nations from all regions – a global qualified majority.
At the same time, there is another question – how to ensure implementation of Security Council’s resolutions even if the right of veto is restricted, resistance by the aggressor in the permanent seat is overcome by the responsible members of the Council, and the strong document is adopted?
For instance, if Russia’s power to cast a veto, by the way legally dubious as no UN organ has ever approved Russia’s permanent membership and the provisions of Article 23 of the UN Charter testify to it, so, if Russia’s power to cast a veto is restricted and a Security Council resolution demanding to withdraw the Russian troops from the sovereign territory of another UN Member State is adopted, should we expect a good-faith implementation of this resolution by the violator? Only if an adequate enforcement toolbox is at the disposal of the Security Council.
Identifying the way to ensure both adequate response by the Security Council to the issues of concern and implementation of the adopted resolution should be in the focus of our deliberations within the IGN process.
I thank you.