As delivered

Statement 

by the Delegation of Ukraine 

in exercise of the right of reply 

to the statement delivered by the Islamic Republic of Iran 

on behalf of a group of States, 

under Cluster 6, “Regional Disarmament and Security,” 

of the First Committee of the 81st session 

of the United Nations General Assembly

(23 October 2026, New York)

Mr. Chair,

Ukraine wishes to exercise its right of reply in response to the statement delivered by the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of a group of States.

We welcome the attention given to the need to prevent attacks against nuclear facilities and the recognition that such actions are unacceptable.

For Ukraine, this issue is a matter of immediate and profound concern.

Yet, there is a striking contradiction between the principles proclaimed in today's statement and the conduct of one of its authors.

Indeed, one of the States behind this statement has considerable practical experience in precisely the activities it now seeks to condemn.

On 24 February 2022, the very day Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, its armed forces occupied the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant site, including facilities used for the management and storage of radioactive waste. The occupation continued until 31 March 2022.

Less than two weeks later, on 4 March 2022, the international community witnessed Russian troops carrying out a direct military assault against the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

During the Russian assault, the plant's premises came under fire. Several buildings were hit, the training centre sustained substantial damage, a fire erupted, and other infrastructure and equipment were affected. Russian forces subsequently established control over Europe's largest nuclear power plant.

This was not merely a warning, a threat or a hypothetical risk.

It was an actual armed attack on a civilian nuclear installation, followed by its forcible seizure and continued occupation.

Mr. Chair,

And Russia's actions against Ukraine's nuclear infrastructure did not stop there.

On 14 February 2025, a Russian drone struck the New Safe Confinement at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant, a protective structure constructed through international efforts to contain the consequences of one of the most devastating nuclear disasters in history. The attack triggered a fire and inflicted significant damage on the facility.

More recently, on 7 June 2026, another Russian drone strike targeted Ukraine's civilian nuclear infrastructure, this time the Centralised Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility. The attack partially destroyed the container reception building and damaged nearby structures, including facilities used by IAEA personnel.

So, for one of the authors of today’s statement, attacks against nuclear facilities are not an abstract legal concept.

Nor is the military seizure of nuclear facilities a theoretical scenario.

Few delegations in this room can claim such extensive first-hand experience with the subject of attacks and seizure of nuclear facilities.

Ukraine therefore takes note of the Russian Federation’s newly expressed condemnation of attacks and threats of attack against nuclear facilities.

We hope that this evolution in rhetoric will soon be followed by an evolution in conduct.

Nuclear facilities must not be attacked.

They must also not be seized by military force.

They must not be occupied.

They must not be militarized.

And they must not be used to support military operations.

If the Russian Federation genuinely wishes to demonstrate its declared commitment, it does not need another joint statement to do so.

It can start with withdrawal from the nuclear power plant it attacked, seized and continues to occupy, namely, Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.