Check against delivery
Explanation of Vote
by Ukraine before the vote
on draft resolutions L.53 and L.54 and the draft decision
on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities
(28 October 2026, New York)
Mr. Chair,
Ukraine takes the floor to explain its position on draft resolutions L.53 and L.54, as well as draft decision L.52, submitted by the Russian Federation under this cluster.
Our delegation will vote against these draft proposals.
However, we have serious concerns regarding both the substance of the Russian proposals and the conduct of their sponsor, which continues to wage a war of aggression against Ukraine in blatant violation of the UN Charter and fundamental principles of international law.
Turning to draft resolution L.54, “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space”.
Russia's repeated calls to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space stand in stark contrast to its own military activities.
Serious concerns remain regarding Russia's reported development of a weapon designed to carry a nuclear device in orbit. The deployment of such a weapon would constitute a grave violation of Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which explicitly prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the Earth. We also recall that Russia vetoed a Security Council draft resolution in April 2024 reaffirming this fundamental obligation.
Furthermore, Russia conducted a destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile test in November 2021, generating thousands of pieces of orbital debris and endangering satellites and human spaceflight.
The Russian proposal fails to address ground-based anti-satellite weapons and other threats to space systems.
These are precisely the threats that any comprehensive approach to preventing an arms race in outer space must address. Their omission from the Russian initiative raises serious questions about its effectiveness and underlying objectives.
Regarding draft resolution L.53, “Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space”.
Ukraine supports practical, effective and verifiable measures to strengthen space security, including legally binding and non-legally binding instruments.
However, the Russian draft promotes a selective approach that fails to adequately address the full spectrum of threats, including those originating from Earth.
Moreover, the new language in both resolutions seeks to predetermine the direction of discussions within the Open-Ended Working Group on PAROS, established with a carefully balanced mandate for 2025–2028.
We strongly oppose attempts to prejudge the outcome of the ongoing negotiations in Geneva or to narrow the scope of discussions to approaches selectively promoted by the Russian Federation.
Modern threats to space security extend beyond weapons placed in orbit. Russia's ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine provides a clear example.
The Russian Federation continues to use ballistic missiles, including intermediate-range systems such as Oreshnik, whose flight trajectories pass through outer space, to strike Ukrainian cities and critical civilian infrastructure. This underscores the importance of addressing threats originating from Earth.
Third, regarding the draft decision on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities.
Ukraine has consistently supported transparency and confidence-building measures as essential elements of responsible behaviour in outer space.
However, Russia's own activities raise serious concerns regarding its commitment to these principles. Russia continues toт engage in irresponsible military activities in orbit, increasing the risks of confrontation and miscalculation.
The recent provocative manoeuvring of the Russian military satellite KOSMOS-2612 in proximity to the commercial satellite, without provides another troubling example.
This incident follows Russia's repeated threats against commercial satellites and its irresponsible military activities in space.
Mr. Chair,
Russia's ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, its development and testing of anti-satellite capabilities, threats against commercial space systems and continued irresponsible behaviour in outer space raise fundamental concerns about the credibility of its initiatives.
Ukraine cannot support proposals that fail to adequately address existing threats to space security while seeking to advance selective approaches that could undermine ongoing multilateral negotiations.
For these reasons, Ukraine will vote against all three Russian proposals.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.